

## Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 6677

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MNUC, NATO

SUBJECT: FUTURE OF NPG

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B. USNATO 5683

SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH CIRCUMSTANCES AND ISSUES HAVE EVOLVED SINCE ESTABLISHMENT OF NPG IN 1966, MISSION BELIEVES NPG STILL SERVES USEFUL ROLE IN ACHIEVING BASIC US OBJECTIVES. MOST IMPORTANTLY, NPG PROVIDES A PRINCIPAL MEANS FOR MAINTAINING ALLIES' CONFIDENCE IN US NUCLEAR COMMITMENT AT A TIME WHEN NATO IS DEALING WITH DIFFICULT NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL SUBJECTS, CHANGES IN NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND POSTURE, AND HIGH PRIORITY EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN ALLIANCE CONVENTIONAL OPTION. CONTINUED SUCCESS OF NPG DEPENDS ON US INPUT, SINCE WE DETERMINE ITS TEMPO, VIGOR AND EFFECTIVENESS. MISSION BELIEVES THAT NPG HAS BEFORE IT A GREAT DEAL OF USEFUL WORK THAT CAN ADVANCE  
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US OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING NUCLEAR ASPECTS OF THE NUNN AMENDMENT, THE TECHNOLOGY STUDY, AND THE FOLLOW-ON USE STUDY PROGRAM. WE CAN ALSO USE THE NPG FOR DEALING WITH OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS, SUCH AS CERTAIN ASPECTS OF OPTION III OF MBFR, DIS-

CLOSURE POLICY, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY. MISSION BELIEVES ANY CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE MODIFICATION OF NPG MEMBERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS MUST, IN PARTICULAR, TAKE CAREFUL ACCOUNT OF GERMAN SENSITIVITIES. MISSION DOUBTS DESIRABILITY OF CHANGING FREQUENCY OF NPG MINISTERIAL MEETINGS, ALTHOUGH SOME CHANGE IN FORMAT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. AT SAME TIME, WE COULD MAKE BETTER USE OF NPG PERMREPS THROUGH MORE FREQUENT MEETINGS ON IMPORTANT NUCLEAR SUBJECTS. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO DISCUSS ANY POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE NPG WITH THE FRG AND UK BEFORE RAISING SUBJECT IN A MINISTERIAL MEETING. END SUMMARY.

1. GENERAL. THE US FOSTERED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NPG TO SATISFY THE DESIRE OF MOST OF OUR ALLIES -- AND PARTICULARLY THE FRG -- TO HAVE A VOICE IN THE FORMULATION OF ALLIANCE NUCLEAR POLICY; TO REASSURE ALLIES OF US NUCLEAR COMMITMENT; TO FOSTER A BETTER UNDERSTANDING AMONG ALLIES OF USES AND LIMITATIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; TO BLUNT PROLIFERATION PRESSURES; AND TO MITIGATE CONCERN OVER ULTIMATE US CONTROL OVER USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BY ALL ACCOUNTS, THE ALLIES-- AND PARTICULARLY THE FRG -- VALUE THE NPG GREATLY. THE NPG IS THEIR PRIMARY WINDOW ON THE NUCLEAR WORLD, SYMBOLIZING THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN NATO NUCLEAR AFFAIRS AND ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY IN NUCLEAR DEFENSE PLANNING. THE FACT THAT ONE NO LONGER HEARS AS MUCH ABOUT THE "NUCLEAR ISSUE" IN NATO DOES NOT MEAN THAT IT IS NO LONGER OF CONCERN TO THE ALLIES, BUT RATHER THAT THE NPG HAS BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN BRINGING IT UNDER CONTROL. OUR ALLIES HAVE A MORE SOPHISTICATED UNDERSTANDING OF NUCLEAR ISSUES NOW AS A RESULT OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE NPG, WHICH HAS PROBABLY ENHANCED ABILITY OF ALLIES TO CONTEMPLATE DIFFICULT NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL ISSUES IN SALT AND MBFR WITHOUT ADVERSE EFFECT ON ALLIANCE COHESION. SECRETARIES MCNAMARA, CLIFFORD, AND LAIRD, AND SCHLESINGER HAVE USED THE NPG TO GOOD EFFECT IN REASSURING THE ALLIES OF THE CONTINUING COMMITMENT OF US EXTERNAL AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES TO THE DEFENSE OF NATO.

2. DESPITE PAST SUCCESS, THERE HAVE BEEN CHANGES SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE NPG AGAINST WHICH THE US MUST EVALUATE THE  
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CONTINUING CONTRIBUTION OF THE NPG IN MEETING US OBJECTIVES. PRIMARY NUCLEAR ISSUES HAVE CHANGED. DURING THE MID-SIXTIES, NATO WAS CONCERNED WITH WHO CONTROLLED THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND HOW THEY WOULD BE USED - THE CLASSIC "NUCLEAR ISSUE" IN NATO. THE NPG DID MUCH TO QUELL THESE CONCERNS THROUGH JOINT, ALLIED PRODUCTIONS OF POLICY PAPERS ON INITIAL TACTICAL USE, CONSULTATION, THEATER STRIKE FORCES, AND ADM'S. THE ISSUES TODAY CENTER MORE ON FORCE MODERNIZATION AND STOCKPILE LEVELS, THE REFINEMENT OF NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE TO FIT THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES OF TODAY'S STRATEGIC BALANCE, AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF THESE QUESTIONS TO DETERRENCE, DEFENSE, AND TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

3. OTHER CHANGES ALSO BEAR ON ALLIANCE NUCLEAR RELATIONS AND POSSIBLE US OBJECTIVES IN THE NPG. CANADIAN AND NETHERLANDS' POLICIES REFLECT A TREND - WHICH MAY BE GROWING - TO WITHDRAW FROM MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR DEFENSE. THIS TREND TROUBLES THE FRG, AND COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT ALLIANCE COHESION AND COMMON DEFENSE. NUCLEAR SECURITY PROBLEMS STEMMING FROM THE TERRORIST THREAT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITIES, PARTICULARLY ALONG THE SOUTHERN FLANK, HAVE BECOME IMPORTANT. THERE ARE STRONG PRESSURES IN THE US TO CHANGE OUR NUCLEAR DISCLOSURE POLICIES. US ATTITUDES TOWARD FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES HAVE CHANGED SINCE THE MID-SIXTIES, COUPLED WITH THE FACT THAT GROWTH OF FRENCH TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES HAS TENDED TO LESSEN RELATIVE PROMINENCE OF UK AMONG THE TWO EUROPEAN NUCLEAR POWERS.

4. MISSION BELIEVES THAT ABOVE FACTORS CAUSE SOME SHIFTS IN EMPHASES, BUT DO NOT CHANGE BASIC NEED FOR SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR CONSULTATION TO ACHIEVE US OBJECTIVES. TRANSCENDING ALL NUCLEAR ISSUES IS CONTINUING NEED TO REASSURE ALLIES OF US NUCLEAR COMMITMENT. DISPROPORTIONATE US CONTRIBUTION TO NUCLEAR POLICY AND DEFENSE, AND ALLIED VIEWS ON KEY ROLE OF NUCS IN DETERRENCE, CREATES SITUATION CALLING FOR CONTINUOUS PROCESS OF CONSULTATIONS TO MAINTAIN ALLIED MORALE AND CONFIDENCE. WE NEED TO WORK CAREFULLY AND DELIBERATELY WITH ALLIES TO KEEP THEM INVOLVED IN NUCLEAR MATTERS, AND GAIN SUPPORT AND ACCEPTANCE FOR CHANGES WE WANT TO MAKE ON KEY NUCLEAR ISSUES. CONCOMITANTLY, PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING US OBJECTIVES IN OTHER AREAS, E.G., STRENGTHENING THE NATO CONVENTIONAL  
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OPTION, WILL BE ENHANCED TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN MAINTAIN ALLIED CONFIDENCE -- AND MOST IMPORTANTLY FRG CONFIDENCE -- IN THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT. CANCELLATION OF THE ROME NPG MINISTRIAL WAS DISTURBING TO OUR ALLIES, BUT WE BELIEVE IT WAS ALSO REASSURING IN THAT IT DEMONSTRATED THAT US TAKES SERIOUS APPROACH TO NUCLEAR CONSULTATIONS. IT IS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THAT MISSION SEES CONTINUING NEED FOR AN ACTIVE, EFFECTIVE NPG.

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SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
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5. NPG CHARTER. MISSION BELIEVES THAT THE NPG CHARTER IS SOUND, AND DOES NOT REQUIRE CHANGE IN ORDER TO CONTINUE TO SERVE US OBJECTIVES. HOWEVER, CONTINUED SUCCESS OF NPG DEPENDS ON US INPUT, SINCE WE DETERMINE ITS TEMPO, VIGOR AND EFFECTIVENESS. THE NPG HAS BEFORE IT A GREAT DEAL OF USEFUL WORK THAT CAN ADVANCE US OBJECTIVES. IN ONE OF HIS LAST MESSAGES FROM USNATO (REF B), AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD PROVIDED VIEW ON THE NPG, AND IN PARTICULAR, ON THE NEED FOR US LEADERSHIP AND INITIATIVE IN THE NPG IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THIS VITAL LINK IN THE CHAIN OF ALLIANCE RELATIONS. THAT MESSAGE POINTED OUT THAT THE US MUST BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE ALLIES ENOUGH INFORMATION FOR THEM TO UNDERSTAND THE ISSUES THEMSELVES, TO EDUCATE THEIR PARLIAMENTS AND PUBLICS, AND TO FOSTER AGREEMENT WITHIN NATO. THERE IS WIDE SCOPE TO ADDRESS MAJOR NUCLEAR ISSUES IN NATO IN KEY ON-GOING ACTIONS SUCH AS THE NUCLEAR ASPECTS OF THE NUNN AMENDMENT, THE TECHNOLOGY STUDY, AND THE FOLLOW-ON USE STUDY PROGRAM. THE PROGRAM OF CONSULTATIONS ON THE NUNN AMEMDMMENT PROPOSED IN REF B COULD REINVIGORATE THE NPG SIGNIFICANTLY, AND COULD PROVIDE THE CONTEXT IN WHICH TO  
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ADDRESS ISSUES OF VITAL CONCERN TO THE US AND OUR ALLIES. THE RECENT US INITIATIVE ON THE NUNN AMENDMENT IN NATO MILITARY CHANNELS MARKS AN IMPORTANT SETP AND COULD BE VERY EFFECTIVE WHEN COUPLED WITH CONSULTATIONS AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. THERE IS MUCH ALLIED INTEREST IN THE TECHNOLOGY STUDY, AND, EQUALLY, DISMAY AT THE DELAYS THE PORJECT HAS ENCOUNTERED. WE COULD PUT THIS STUDY TO GOOD USE AND SHOULD GET IT STARTED AGAIN SOON. ADDITIONALLY, CIRCULATION OF THE LONG-AWAITED US/UK/FRG PHASE II PRELIMINARY REPORT WILL INJECT INTO THE NPG A SUBJECT OF BASIC IMPORTANCE WHICH PROVIDES AN EXCELLENT CONTEXT FOR ADVANCING US VIEWS ON DOCTRINE FOR THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN THIS CONNECTION, A CONSPICUOUS EXAMPLE OF USE OF THE NPG TO ACHIEVE US OBJECTIVES IN A RELATED AREA WAS PROVESS OF CONSULTATIONS ON CHANGES IN STRATEGIC TARGETING POLICY THAT WE CARRIED OUT DURING LAST HALF OF 1974. THE NPG COULD ALSO TAKE UP OTHER TIMELY SUBJECTS SUCH AS DECLASS-IFIFICATION AND SECURITY OF WEAPONS. ARMS CONTROL SUBJECTS ARE AT FOREFRONT OF ALLIANCE CONCERNS TODAY, AND THE NPG COULD

BE USED MORE IN THIS FIELD. IN PARTICULAR, MISSION BELIEVES THE NPG SHOULD, AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME, PARTICIPATE IN CERTAIN ASPECTS OF NATO REVIEW OF OPTION III OF MBFR.

6. MEMBERSHIP. THE US HAD SEVERAL MAJOR REASONS FOR ESTABLISHING AN NPG OF LIMITED MEMBERSHIP:

- PROVIDE A SPECIAL PLACE FOR FRG AS A PERMANENT MEMBER (ALONG WITH THE UK AND ITALY) OF AN EXCLUSIVE AND LIMITED GROUP WHICH DEALT WITH CENTRAL ISSUES OF ALLIANCE NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND POLICY;
- FOSTER DIRECT PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT OF ALLIED DEFENSE MINISTERS IN FRANK AND INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF VIEW ON DIFFICULT NUCLEAR PLANNING ISSUES;
- FACILITATE DISCUSSION OF HIGHLY CLASSIFIED AND SENSITIVE US NUCLEAR PLANNING INFORMATION.

7. MISSION BELIEVES THAT ABOVE REASONS REMAIN IMPORTANT. FIRST, THE SPECIAL POSITION OF THE FRG IS PERHAPS THE PRINCIPAL REASON FOR PRESERVING THE EXISTING MEMBERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS. THE FRG VALUES ITS POSITION AS A PERMANENT MEMBER VERY HIGHLY. WE SHOULD CONSIDER ANY MODIFICATION OF NPG MEMBERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS WITH GREAT CARE IN ORDER TO BE SURE THAT THEY ADEQUATELY

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SATISFY GERMAN INTERESTS - A RESULT IN WHICH ALL ALLIES HAVE A DEEP AND ABIDING INTEREST. SECOND, THE QUALITY AND INFORMALITY OF MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS COULD DECLINE IN A LARGER GROUP. THE NPG IS A UNIQUE ORGANIZATION IN THE ALLIANCE STRUCTURE, AND IF IT WERE ENLARGED, IT MIGHT SIMPLY BECOME "JUST ANOTHER NATO COMMITTEE." US SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE HAVE APPARENTLY VALUED THE FORMAT OF NPG MEETINGS AND THE OPPORTUNITY FOR RELATIVELY UNSTRUCTURED DISCUSSIONS THEY OFFER. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO CONTINUE TO BE FORTHCOMING, SINCE HIS ROLE IS CRUCIAL TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NPG. THIRD, WASHINGTON HAS CONSISTENTLY ARGUED THAT AN ENLARGED NPG WOULD MEAN A LESSENING OF THE AMOUNT OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION THE US WOULD PROVIDE, APPARENTLY BECAUSE OF CONCERN OVER POSSIBLY GREATER SECURITY RISKS. THE ALLIES WOULD NOT SUPPORT ENLARGEMENT OF THE NPG IF THEY BELIEVED THAT THIS WOULD OCCUR.

8. NONETHELESS, THERE ARE COSTS INVOLVED IN PRESENT MEMBERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS. THEY ARE A CONTINUING IRRITANT TO NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS; THEY PREVENT THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FROM REACHING A WIDER AUDIENCE ON SUBJECTS WHERE THIS COULD BE PARTICULARLY BENEFICIAL; AND THEY CAUSE MINISTERS OF NON-PERMANENT MEMBER COUNTRIES TO LOSE OUT PERIODICALLY ON THE "EDUCATIONAL" BENEFIT PROVIDED BY MINISTERIAL MEETINGS. DESPITE THESE COSTS, MISSION BELIEVES THAT PRESENT MEMBERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS CONTINUE TO SERVE USEFUL PURPOSES, IN PARTICULAR THAT OF PROVIDING A SPECIAL ROLE FOR THE FRG. ENLARGEMENT OF MEMBERSHIP

WOULD NOT SEEM NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE US OBJECTIVES  
IN THE NPG.

9. FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS. MISSION DOUBTS THE DESIRABILITY OF  
CHANGING THE FREQUENCY OF NPG MINISTERIAL MEETINGS TO 9-12  
MONTH INTERVALS. EXTENDING THE INTERVAL BETWEEN MEETINGS  
WOULD LESSEN ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE NPG,  
THE INVOLVEMENT OF MINISTERS. POLITICALLY, SUCH A CHANGE MIGHT  
ALSO SUGGEST LESS USINTEREST IN NUCLEAR CONSULTATION.  
NONETHELESS, MISSION RECOGNIZES THAT TWO SEPARATE NPG MINISTERIAL  
MEETINGS A YEAR IMPOSE A BURDEN ON BUSY MINISTERS, PARTICULARLY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. TO ALLEVIATE THIS PROBLEM, IT MAY  
MAY BE WORTH CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING ONE NPG  
MEETING IN A HOST COUNTRY IN THE SPRING OF EACH YEAR AND ANOTHER  
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IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE DPC MINISTERIALS IN DECEMBER. THE  
SECOND MEETING COULD POSSIBLY BE OF A SHORTER VARIETY, SUCH AS  
THE TYPE WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE THIS DECEMBER.

10. APART FROM QUESTION OF FREQUENCY OF MINISTERIAL MEETINGS,  
MISSION BELIEVES, AS STATED IN PARA 7 OF REF B, THAT US COULD  
MAKE BETTER USE OF NPG PERM REPS. NPG PERM REPS HAVE  
MET ONLY 3-4 TIMES A YEAR RECENTLY, OFTEN ON SUBJECTS OF  
SECONDARY IMPORTANCE TO THE US AND ITS ALLIES. WE CAN MAKE  
GREATER USE OF NPG PERM REPS IN ADVANCING US OBJECTIVES BY MORE  
FREQUENT MEETINGS ON IMPORTANT NUCLEAR SUBJECTS.

11. NPG STAFF GROUP. THE STAFF GROUP SERVES A USEFUL PURPOSE  
IN DAY-TO-DAY COORDINATION OF NPG ACTIVITIES, AS WELL AS STAFF  
LEVEL PREPARATION FOR PERM REP AND MINISTERIAL MEETINGS. AS  
SUGGESTED IN REF B, MISSION BELIEVES THAT WE COULD USE THE  
STAFF GROUP FOR MORE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS THAN WE HAVE IN THE  
PAST. WE CAN DO SOME SPADE WORK ON NUCLEAR ISSUES IN THE STAFF  
GROUP BY SETTING OUT US VIEWS AND EDUCATING MEMBERS ON NUCLEAR  
MATTERS. OUR ALLIES OFTEN UTILIZE THEIR STAFF GROUP REPRESENTA-  
TIVES IN BRUSSELS AS KEY STAFF LEVEL ADVISORS ON NUCLEAR ISSUES.  
CONSEQUENTLY, REPRESENTATIVES CAN PROVIDE A USEFUL CONDUIT FOR  
THE ADVANCEMENT OF US VIEWS.

12. DISCUSSION OF FUTURE OF NPG WITH ALLIES. MISSION BELIEVES  
THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO DISCUSS ANY POSSIBLE CHANGES IN  
THE NPG BILATERALLY WITH THE UK AND FRG BEFORE RAISING SUBJECT  
IN A MINISTERIAL MEETING.  
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